Using an experiment, we study the effects of leniency programs on cartel deterrence, stability, duration and price behavior, when the antitrust authority has the possibility to decide upon the probability of investigation and offers only partial...

Through an experiment, this paper examines which effects an endogenous antitrust agency, that has the possibility to decide upon probability of investigation, has on cartel deterrence, stability and pricing behavior. For a repeated Bertrand pricing...

In this paper, we analyze a game between firms and an antitrust authority that has imperfect knowledge about production cost and no commitment to its auditing policy. We find that for a relatively heavy weight of consumer surplus in the antitrust...

In this paper, we develop a model to study a dynamic enforcement game between an antitrust authority and several firms. Our main result is that the stylized European penalty legislation appears not to be as efficient as it could be, in the sense...