Double-sided moral hazard, information screening and the optimal contract
Year
: 2016DOI: 10.1108/CFRI-04-2016-0015
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Double-sided moral hazard, information screening and the optimal contract
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| contributor author | Jin Xue | |
| contributor author | Yiwen Fei | |
| date accessioned | 2020-03-15T03:28:04Z | |
| date available | 2020-03-15T03:28:04Z | |
| date issued | 2016 | |
| identifier other | tCug4X2E0bvXnQLNmTcKu1s90JyNRa3hUezjVpYTILXVteLlvU.pdf | |
| identifier uri | http://libsearch.um.ac.ir:80/fum/handle/fum/1830047 | |
| format | general | |
| language | English | |
| title | Double-sided moral hazard, information screening and the optimal contract | |
| type | Journal Paper | |
| contenttype | Fulltext | |
| contenttype | Fulltext | |
| identifier padid | 12950362 | |
| identifier doi | 10.1108/CFRI-04-2016-0015 | |
| journal title | China Finance Review International | |
| coverage | Academic | |
| pages | 404-431 | |
| journal volume | 6 | |
| journal issue | 4 | |
| filesize | 468201 | |
| citations | 1 |